German Offensive.

"Early on the morning of 30 September 1941, Field Marshal von Bock's three panzer armies launched a tremendous attack on the Russian defences guarding the approaches to Moscow. From the south and northwest, endless columns of German vehicles roared and rumbled across the rugged countryside on a front more than 400 miles wide. The weather was perfect; the sun shone with the golden pallor of a Russian autumn. German Stukas and low-flying bombers struck ahead of the advancing columns, bombing Russian defenses, known troop concentrations, airfields, towns, and cities. ( Alfred Turney - "Disaster at Moscow" p 92)

"The Germans followed a short artillery preparation with a dense smokescreen along the front, and they launched air strikes that put the Western Front headquarters out of action temporarily. Although the Soviet troops held their forward defenses in most locations, 4th Panzer Group (Army) was able to advance along the weakly defended boundary between the Reserve and Briansk Fronts, enveloping the southern flank of 43rd Army. Similarly, 3rd Panzer Group (Army) penetrated between the 19th and 30th Armies northwest of Viazma. The two armored spearheads pressed forward, linking up at Viazma on 8 October.
Konev's deputy, Ltn-Gen. I.V.Boldin, was in charge of the Westren Front counterattack, repeating the role he had performed in June. He was no more successful on the second occasion. Boldin's operational group, consisting of three divisions and two tank brigades, counterattacked the flanks of 3rd Panzer group (Army) on 3-4 October, and attempted to cover the withdrawal of other Western Front units on 6 October. The STAVKA had belatedly authorized this withdrawal once the German breakthroughs were apparent, but the Reserve Front lost communications with the headquarters of 24th and 43rd Armies, and Konev's Western Front headquarters soon lost contact with Boldin. In the ensuing desperate struggle, most of the 19th, 20th, 24th, and 32nd Armies, as well as much of Boldin's operational group, were encircled west of Viazma." (David Glantz - "When Titans clashed" pp 79)

Photo: one of the mine dogs that the Russians employed. The dogs were trained to crawl under tanks. The triggering rod sticking up above their back then set off the demolition charge on the dog's back.
Photo: Russian artillery firing positions wiped out by German artillery. In spite of all their firepower, tanks are dependant on the support of indirect fire. That is especially important in attacking deeply echeloned defenses or preventing the prompt reinforcement of the enemy in defense. The units of panzer-grenadiers were often equipped with heavy assault guns. The assault gun's main aim was to knock out pill-boxes, machine gun nests, anti-tank guns and other obstacles. They were towed by trucks rather than the relatively rare armored and self-propelled models. (Of 226 panzergrenadier battalions in September 1943, only 26 were equipped with armoured half tracks, or just over 10 percent. The rest were equipped with trucks.)

The surviving elements of the Western and Reserve Fronts fell back to the next planned defensive line near Mozhaisk and Kaluga. ... German 9th and 4th Armies had great difficulty in containing this pocket in the face of repeated Soviet efforts to escape. On the night of 12 to 13 October, at least two rifle (infantry) divisions broke out to the east through a swampy sector where German armor could not maneuver. ...
Meanwhile to the south, 2nd Panzer Group (Army) had jumped off on 30 September, penetrating ... weak 13th Army of the Briansk Front by 2 October and pushing on to Orel on the following day. Stalin telephoned Yeremenko to demand an immediate counterattack, but the Briansk Front had few tanks and no reserves. In a later telephone call, Marshal Shaposhnikov insisted on a rigid defense of every position, denying Yeremenko the chance to delay the attackers through flexible maneuvering.
The German breakthrough was so sudden that streetcars were still running in Orel when 4th Panzer Division rolled in. The bypassed 13th and 50th Armies, together with the headquarters of the Briansk Front, were pushed into two large pockets by German 2nd Army. ...
The Germans were finally slowed by a combination of adverse weather and determined counterattacks. The first snow fell in Army Group Centre's sector on the night of 6-7 October. It soon melted but was followed by the rainy rasputitza (literally time without roads), a period of mud that strikes Russia each spring and fall as the seasons change. German mechanized units used up motor fuel at 3 times the rate they had planned. ...
Even before poor weather arrived, however, a series of Soviet counterattacks along the entire front helped stabilize the situation. Perhaps the most effective of these blows fell on Guderian's 4th Panzer Division as it approached Mtsensk on 6 October. Here two Soviet officers who later gained fame as superb battlefield commanders cooperated to ambush the Germans. Majo-General D.D.Leliushenko's 1st Guards Rifle Corps had rushed to the scene to block the advance of 2nd Panzer Group (Army). Leliushenko's troops included two tank brigades, the 4th and 11th, and two airborne brigades, the 10th and 201st of 5th Airborne Corps, flown to a nearby airfield.
Colonel M.E.Katukov's 4th Tank Brigade, equipped with newly produced T-34s, displayed a tactical ability that the invaders had not encountered before. ... By the end of the day, most of 4th Panzer Division's armor had been reduced to smoking hulls. This shock to 2nd Panzer Group (Army) was so great that a special investigation was conducted. Even Guderian grudgingly acknowledged that his opponents were learning.
But it was a near-run race. Following his usual habit, Stalin sent Zhukov from Leningrad to the threatened sector, making him commander of the Western Front on 10 October. Zhukov had to plead with Stalin to keep his former rival Konev as his deputy in order to maintain continuity and morale in the headquarters. Zhukov found almost no surviving units to defend the road to Moscow. ...
In Moscow the initial reaction to the disaster was to deny that any breakthrough had occured and to search for scapegoats. Once the enormity of the danger sank in, Stalin came close to panic. On 13 October he ordered the evacuation of the bulk of Communist Party, STAVKA, and civil government offices from Moscow to Kuibyshev, leaving only skeleton staffs behind. The news of this evacuation, in combination with repeated German air raids and a variety of wild rumors about the Viazma-Briansk battles, produced near-panic in Moscow on 16 to 17 October. Much of the population tried to flee, mobbing the avaiable trains for fear of imminent occupation. Only the announcement that Stalin himself remained in the city stilled the panic." (David Glantz - "When Titans clashed" p 81)

"By late October, the Wehrmacht and the Red Army resembled two punch-drunk boxers, staying precariously on their feet but rapidly losing the power to hurt each other. Like prizefighters with swollen eyes, they were unable to see their opponents with sufficient clarity to judge their relative endurance. In retrospect, the German forces had gone as far as possible for 1941 and needed to go into winter quarters. At the time, however, the STAVKA had to face the possibility that, once the first hard frost restored mobility, the invaders would be able to capture or at least encircle Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad, and Rostov." (David Glantz - "When Titans clashed" pp 81-82)

"In early November, Western Front intelligence analyst identified preparations for this encirclement, and Zhukov badgered Stalin into aproving a whole series of spoiling attacks on advancing German forces, while other front forces manned the prepared defenses covering the approaches to Moscow. One such attack by Group Belov against Guderian's right flank, caught the German 112th Infantry Division with no anti-tank weapons that were effective against the attacking T-34s. The result was a panicked retreat by most of the division on 17 November, an event almost unprecedented in the German Army.
The day before, however, 44th Mongolian Cavalry Division, was committed southwest of Klin in a mounted counterattack across an open, snow-covered field. Two thousands cavalrymen and their horses were cut down by artillery fire and machine guns of German 106th Infantry Division, which suffered no casualties. ...
While Zhukov's spoiling attacks continued, the ground had frozen hard, and von Bock's Army Group Centre resumed the offensive on 15 November. ... In the north, where General Hoth's redesignated 3rd Panzer Army posed the most immediate threat to the Russian capital, a desperate fight developed for control of the highway running from Kalinin through Klin to Moscow. (David Glantz - "When Titans clashed" pp 84-85)

German offensive.

"In the south, 2nd Panzer Army resumed the offensive on 18 November, after recovering from the brief panic caused by the Soviet attack of the previous day. ... Boldin's 50th Army, tenaciously defending the outskirts of Tula, launched counterattack after counterattack against Guderian's front and flank. With temperatures well below freezing and troops running out of fuel, ammunition, and functioning vehicles, the German advance slowly shuddered to a halt. Guderian repeatedly asked that the offensive be canceled, but no one in OKH had the authority to take such an action without Hitler's consent. Dogged Soviet defenses did as much to stop the Germans as did bad weather and poor supply lines." (David Glantz - "When Titans clashed" pp 85)

Russian Counteroffensive.

"The Red Army did not have an abundance of forces to launch a counteroffensive. Soviet historians have claimed that, as of 1 December, there were 1,100,000 Soviet troops facing 1,708,000 Germans in German Army Group Center, with similar disproportions in equipent ... These figures vastly overestimate effective German strength, but they correctly assess Red Army strength. Many Soviet units were mere skeletons. The 108th Tank Division, for example, was down to 15 out of 217 authorized tanks ...
The Soviet winter campaign began on 5 December 1941. Driven by necessity, the STAVKA first sought to blunt and repel the German armored pincers threatening Moscow." (David Glantz - "When Titans clashed" pp 87)

"The 29th and 31st Armies of Konev's newly formed Kalinin Front attacked from the northern side of the bulge. The following day, 30th and 1st Shock Armies struck from positions north and south of Dmitrov on the Volga-Moscow Canal. By noon of 7 December, advanced Soviet units were overruning the headquarters of LVI Panzer Corps outside Klin. Thereafter Zhukov sent three additional armies (20th, 16th, and 5th) into the attack against the southern side of the Klin Bulge, seeking to encircle all of 3rd Panzer Army as well as the XXXXVI Panzer Corps of 4th Panzer Army. ...
In the south similar pincer movement was attempted against Guderian's 2nd Panzer army. Belov's Cavalry-Mechanized Corps immediately cut off the lead German elements near the tip of the Venev bulge, while an attack from Boldin's 50th Army at Tula overran one battalion of the elite Grossdeutschland Regiment. From the first day of the Soviet counterattack, Guderian began withdrawing back to the line of the Don River, southeast of Tula, because his line of communications was threatened by Belov.
Soviet ski battalions harrassed the German withdrawal in the snow, but the Soviet main forces were too weak and immobile to encircle the bulge completely before the Germans escaped. (David Glantz - "When Titans clashed" pp 89)

Germans surrender to the Russians.

"By 16 December, the Soviet counteroffensive at Moscow had forced the Army Group Center's commander, von Bock, to make a similar request for authority to withdraw and ajust positions as necessary. Late that night, Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch, chief of OKH, and General Halder, chief of the General Staff, explained the situation to Hitler, who insisted that a general withdrawal was out of the question. On 18 December, von Bock surrendered his command to Field Marshal von Kluge, ostensibly because of his genuine ill health. ... Hitler forbade any further major withdrawals, ordering Army Group center to use 'fanatical resistance' to stem the tide until reinforcements could arrive." (David Glantz - "When Titans clashed" pp 90)

Soviet cavalry.

By 1 January the Red Army had retaken Kalinin and Kaluga and were besieging a series of German strongholds, some of which had already been bypassed and surrounded. On 7 January, Stalin ordered a general offensive along the entire front, concentrated primarily against Army Group Center. The Kalinin and Western Fronts attacked Viazma from the north, east and south. The Soviet cavalry led by Belov played an important role in the exploitation into the German rear. The threat to the Group Army Center was real, as a gaping hole existed in German line south of Kaluga. Within days Belov's cavalry raced through this hole into Germans' rear and toward Viazma. The Red Army retook Mozhaisk but thereafter the weather was so bad that their advance toward Gzhatzk took place at a snal's pace. Only the 33rd army was able to reach Viazma. The advance of 33rd and 43rd Armies was assisted by airborne drops.

Aftermath.

"The entire issue of the impact of poor weather conditions upon the conduct of Operation Typhoon has been distorted by decades of disinformation from both sides and gross oversimplification. Operation Typhoon was fought over a large area - 500 km - from north to south - and weather conditions often varied considerably along the front. It is clear from both German and Soviet weather data that while the offensive was hindered by passing periods of poor weather, that the worst winter weather did not arrive until after Typhoon had culminated." ( Robert Forczyk - "Moscow 1941" p 90)

"The primary reason that Operation Typhoon failed was serious German operational mistakes, combined with a logistic system that was not up to the task. The critical operational mistakes were:

• Hitler and the OKH's failure to weight the main effort to seize Moscow, in that they maintained simultaneous offensives in the other two army groups that deprived Army Group Centre of vital reinforcements and supplies
  
• Guderian failed to seal off the Brians and Trubchevsk Pockets, which allowed thousands of Soviet troops to escape to Tula
  
• the OKH's dilution of the main effort by directing 9th Army and part of 3rd Panzer Army to advance northward towards Kalinin and 2nd Army to advance towards Kursk.
  
• von Kluge's deliberate disobedience in not supporting the second phase of Typhoon
  
• von Bock's removal of virtually all of 3rd Panzer Army's infantry divisions in order to reinforce the operationally useless fighting around Kalinin
  
• Reinhardt's failure to maintain an adequate mobile reserve to safeguard his vulnerable left flank
  
• the diversion of Luftwaffe assets to other fronts just as Typhoon was approaching success deprived Army Group Centre of vital close air support
  
• von Bock's operational plan for a double envelopment ignored the shortage of fuel, distances, and terrain involved and weather conditions.
  In essence, Typhoon was a flawed plan, executed poorly and only initially successful due to gross ineptitude of the Red Army. Althought the Soviets like to claim that they stopped the German offensive, the performance of the Red Army against Typhoon was generally weak. Despite the fact that the Western Front had established a fortified line reserves, Army Group Centre penetrated the Soviet front line at multiple points and encircled the bulk of the Western and Biansk Fronts in a week. Other than a few examples of small units putting up stout resistance, most Soviet units ran away or collapsed in front of the blitzkrieg. General Boldin's defense of Tula was the only major Soviet defensive success during Typhoon." ( Robert Forczyk - "Moscow 1941" p 92)

Both German and Russian losses have been a subject of debate. David Glantz in his book "When Titans Clashed", gives Russian casualties at 658,279 for the defense phase alone, plus 370,955 for the winter counteroffensive until Jan 7 1942. The Moscow Encyclopedia (publ. in 1997) gives 145,000 German and 900,000 Russian casualties for the defensive phase, and 103,000 German and 380,000 Russian casualties for the counteroffensive until Jan 7 1942.

Debates have raged for decades among historians and military buffs over the turning point of the war on the eastern front. These debates have surfaced 3 candidates for the honor of being termend "turning point":